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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
 
 No. 12-1660 
 _________________ 
 
GEORGE J. TAYLOR, III, 
                                             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
JOSEPH P. NISH, SUPERINTENDENT  
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1:11-cv-00642) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit 
 L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 and on Appellant’s Request for a 
  Certificate of Appealability Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) 
October 25, 2012 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed:  January 30, 2013) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION 
_________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 George Taylor, a Pennsylvania prisoner, appeals from an order dismissing his 
habeas corpus petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state-court remedies.  We 
2 
 
will vacate and remand for further proceedings. 
 Because our decision today is narrow, we will not recite the factual history of this 
case, with which the parties are familiar.  Taylor filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in 
January 2010 (M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1:10-cv-00206), in which he appeared to challenge the 
processes used to issue a Pennsylvania state detainer, as well as the procedures 
surrounding a then-upcoming parole revocation hearing.  The District Court swiftly 
dismissed the petition without prejudice as unexhausted on February 1, 2010.  Taylor 
then filed his second such petition—the one at issue in this appeal—in which he again 
challenged the detainer and/or parole proceedings.  In fact, the parties disagreed on the 
main thrust of the petition; the Commonwealth took the view that Taylor was trying to 
attack his parole revocation and urged that the petition be dismissed as procedurally 
defaulted or, alternatively, as meritless, whereas Taylor reiterated that the “sole reason” 
for his challenge was that there had “never been a detainer lodged [against him]” and thus 
that he was held in custody illegally.  Once again, the District Court dismissed Taylor’s 
petition without prejudice as unexhausted, determining that he had “failed to exhaust his 
state court remedies with respect to the detainer” because his attempts to pursue state 
remedies had all been dismissed for failure to comply with procedural requirements.  See 
generally Taylor v. Nish, No. 1:11-CV-0642, 2012 WL 258659 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2012).  
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Taylor timely appealed,1
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).
 again arguing that the detainer lodged by the Commonwealth 
was invalid. 
2
of the District Court’s exhaustion analysis is plenary.  
  Our review 
See Holloway v. Horn
91 707, 713 (3d Cir. 2004).  Summary action is appropriate when an appeal presents no 
substantial question.  
, 355 F.3d 
See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam); see also
 While Taylor’s habeas petition may indeed be “unexhausted,” that should not 
portend the end of the inquiry, especially if the respondents urge (as is the case here) that 
parts of the petition are either procedurally defaulted or, in the alternative, are moot; were 
we to leave the judgment of the District Court undisturbed, Taylor would be able to file 
another habeas petition based on the same set of facts, requiring an additional investment 
of time and expense by Taylor, the respondents, and the courts.  
 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
See Coleman v. 
Thompson
                                                 
1 The case was originally stayed due to a pending post-judgment motion.  The motion has 
been resolved, but since Taylor has not amended his notice of appeal, it is not currently 
before the Court.  See United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 668 (3d Cir. 2000).   
, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991) (discussing procedural default).  While 
resolution of Taylor’s petition is complicated by the fact that he and the Commonwealth 
are arguing at cross purposes—he about the detainer, the Commonwealth primarily about 
 
2 Taylor’s request for a certificate of appealability is granted, as the dismissal of 
his habeas petition on the ground of non-exhaustion is debatable, and the petition, at least 
as measured against the limited record before this Court, can be said to state a valid due-
process claim.  See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).   
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the parole issue—it appears that Taylor’s claims pertaining to the detainer may have been 
mooted by the passage of time, and that his parole concerns may now be procedurally 
defaulted due to a lack of an available state remedy.  Although the Commonwealth urges 
us to summarily affirm rather than remand, we believe that these inquiries are better 
conducted by the District Court in the first instance. 
 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order of the District 
Court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
